We found the levels of [11C] (R)-MeQAA BPND significantly lower in the middle frontal cortex (p = 0.036) in patients with schizophrenia. Additionally, there was a trend towards a decreased level of BPND in the temporal cortex (p = 0.067) and parietal cortex (p = 0.087) in the brains of schizophrenia patients, although it failed to reach statistical significance. There was no difference in the superior frontal cortex. Discussion: To our knowledge, this represents the first demonstration of anomalies in the acetylcholinergic system in the in vivo brains of schizophrenia patients. However, this is regarded as a pilot study, and further recruitment of schizophrenia patients with a recent onset and minimal use of antipsychotic medication, followed by scanning and data analyses, will be continued. 
F149. NEUROBIOLOGY OF SELF-AGENCY

University of Minnesota
Background: Self-agency is the experience of being the agent of one's own thoughts and motor actions. The intact experience of self-agency is necessary for successful interactions with the outside world (i.e., reality monitoring). Reality monitoring is the ability to distinguish internally self-generated information from outside reality (externally-derived information). We found that healthy control (HC) participants recruit medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during encoding of self-generated information, which is also activated during accurate retrieval of self-generated information. By contrast, patients with schizophrenia (SZ) have specific self-agency impairments and do not show mPFC activation during encoding or retrieval of self-generated information. These findings indicate that SZ may rely more on environmental externally-derived information, rather than on internal self-generated information, to guide reality monitoring. Here, we relate the experience of self-agency during a lower-level speech feedback monitoring (i.e., monitoring what we hear ourselves say) to our higher-level cognitive reality monitoring task. We examine whether the sense of self-agency during speech feedback monitoring and reality monitoring are driven by the same fundamental mechanism that we hypothesize underlies the capacity to experience self-agency-the ability to make reliable predictions about the outcomes of self-generated actions. Methods: During speech feedback monitoring we assess self-agency by altering environmental auditory feedback so that participants listen to a perturbed version of their own speech. When subjects hear minimal perturbations in their auditory feedback while speaking, they make corrective responses, indicating that they judge the perturbations as errors in their speech output. These corrective responses are modulated by subjects' reliance on internal predictions about the outcome of their speech output; the more subjects rely on their internal predictions, i.e. their sense of self-agency, the less they rely on external auditory feedback, resulting in smaller corrective responses. Thus, subjects who produced smaller corrective responses manifested an enhanced sense of self-agency in that they relied more on their internal predictions to generate their own actions (i.e., their speech output). Results: We found that self-agency judgments in the reality-monitoring task were higher in people who had smaller corrective responses (p=.05) during minimal speech perturbations of their auditory feedback. These results provide support for a unitary process for the experience of self-agency resulting from the ability to reliably predict the outcomes of self-generated actions, that governs low-level speech control and higher level reality monitoring. Discussion: These findings have important therapeutic implications in SZ, suggesting that the more participants rely on internal predictions to guide their actions, the smaller their corrective responses in their speech output, and the more likely they are to make correct judgments of self-agency during reality monitoring. In conclusion, these findings, therefore, indicate that reality monitoring and speech monitoring paradigms provide quick and robust markers of the experience of selfagency, indicating which subjects followed their internal predictions to guide their own actions. Together, these findings have important therapeutic implications for potentiating improvements in self-agency judgments not only in HC, but in patients with schizophrenia who suffer from critical self-agency impairments. 
F150. OVERESTIMATING ENVIRONMENTAL
University of Zurich & ETH Zurich
Background: Reward-based decision-making is impaired in schizophrenia, as reflected by increased switching between choices. The underlying cognitive mechanisms and associated neural signatures remain unknown. Reinforcement learning (RL) and hierarchical Bayesian learning account for this behavior in different ways. We hypothesized that enhanced switching during flexible reward-based decision-making in schizophrenia relates to higher-order beliefs about environmental volatility and examined the associated neural signatures. Methods: 46 medicated schizophrenia patients and 43 controls underwent a reward-based decision-making task requiring flexible behavior to changing action-outcome contingencies during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Computational modeling of behavior was performed, including RL and the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF). The estimated learning trajectories informed the analysis of fMRI data. Results: A three-level HGF accounted best for the observed choice data and revealed a heightened prior belief about environmental volatility and a stronger influence of volatility on lower-level learning of action-outcome contingencies in schizophrenia. This finding was replicated in an independent sample of unmedicated patients. Beliefs about environmental volatility were reflected by higher activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) of patients compared to controls. Discussion: This study suggests a mechanistic explanation for instable behavior in schizophrenia: patients inferred the environment as being too volatile and thus overestimated environmental changes, leading to maladaptive choice switching. Our data suggest enhanced dlPFC activity related to beliefs about environmental volatility as a neural learning signature of instable behavior. Such detailed 'computational phenotyping' may provide useful information to dissect clinical heterogeneity and could improve prediction of outcome.
